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Abstract - Many insider attacks originate from misuse of 
privileges granted by organizations to their internal employees, 
contractors or third-party service providers. A fundamental 
means of ensuring that conflicts of privilege cannot occur is to 
segregate role allocations in order to ensure that no individual can 
perform a task from beginning to end. In this paper, we provide 
background on insider attacks in connection with conflicts in 
Segregation of Duties, and present the current strategies for 
preventing and detecting such conflicts. To illustrate how a 
conflict can occur and what can result, we present an in-depth 
case study demonstrating a conflict in Segregation of Dutiesin an 
organization, along with the consequent fraud, and we discuss 
how it might have been prevented. 
Keywords-insider threats; segregation-of-duties; SoD; misuse of 
privileges 
I. SEGREGATION OF DUTIES AND INSIDER THREATS 
Cyber-attacks are a challenge to many organizations for 
whom network connectivity is a major support to the business. 
Cyber threats come from organized crime units who specifically 
target certain organizations, as well as from opportunistic 
individuals including contractors and internal employees. 
Regardless of the threat source, these attacks have implications 
for the organizations targeted, including the waste of valuable 
time in conducting security investigations and forensic analysis, 
in recovering from successful intrusions and in addressing 
subsequent regulatory implications. There is also the potential 
for damage to reputation and loss of shareholder trust. 
For the purposes of this paper, we consider an ‘insider’ of 
an organization to be a person who has somelevel of access to 
the IT systems of the organization. Insiders are usually 
employees, contractors, consultants or personnel from third-
party service providers who would have been granted legitimate 
access to IT systems [1]. An insider threat could arise from 
anyone in these categories because these people have 
knowledge of the internal IT system and sometimes of the 
security controls protecting it[2][3].  
In many cases of insider-generated cyber-attacks, the 
perpetrator is someone already known to the organization. 
According to a global survey of over 10,000 senior company 
members located in the Americas, Europe, Africa, the Middle 
East and the Asia-Pacific regions conducted by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers in 2003 [4], current and former 
employees remain the highest internal threat source. 
Results of the survey demonstrate that attacks originating 
from the internal network often develop from misuse of user 
privileges that have been granted to internal employees. In fact, 
the 2012 annual Data Breach Investigations Report by Verizon 
[5]highlighted that although the trend of insider attacks on 
organizations was decreasing, one of the main sources of 
breaches is from “abuse of system access privileges”. 
The survey results demonstrate that one of the major 
challenges many organizations face is controlling who has 
access to fundamental systems and applications and allocating 
appropriate privileges to people to support them in performing 
their duties.  
Segregation-of-duties (SoD) is a type of internal control 
many organizations implement to minimize the risk of 
fraudulent activities. It is designed to reduce the opportunity for 
fraudulent activities [6][7]. When properly implemented, it 
ensures that no individual can complete a critical business 
process from start to finish. It is also designed to ensure that 
users cannot execute multiple transactions resulting in conflict 
from a SOD standpoint, such as allowing a user to create a 
fictitious or fraudulent entry using one transaction, and the 
same user to conceal the fraud using another transaction [8].  
According to Ernst & Young[7], the key reasons for SoD 
breaches  include: (1) complexity and variety of the systems to 
implement it, (2) lack of ownership and accountability for 
controlling the processes, and (3) lack of proper checks and 
balances. 
In the next section, we explore the current prevention and 
detection mechanisms designed to address the issue with SoD 
conflicts. This is followed by a case study describing how a 
breach of SoD enables an insider to attack a company, 
accompanied by discussion of what happened and how it could 
have been avoided.  
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II. CURRENT STRATEGIES FOR PREVENTION AND DETECTION OF 
SOD CONFLICTS 
In this section, we explore the current prevention and 
detection mechanisms designed to address SoD conflicts. 
A. Adoption of Industry-accepted Security Management 
Framework 
A widely accepted approach is the adoption of good 
practices in information security management. ISO 27001 
(based on the earlier version, ISO 17799) is the dominant 
security standard used by many organizations in information 
security management. This standard has a set of security 
controls designed to address the risk to information and 
information systems security. 
B. Use of Deliberate Markers 
It was noted by Schultz [1] that little progress has been 
made in regards to stopping internal attackers. Schultz 
attributed this problem to the lack of substantial understanding 
of the ‘insider threat’ [1]. In Schultz’s paper, he indicated that 
what might be a promising approach in detecting and predicting 
insider attacks is the use of multiple regression techniques, 
utilizing a combination of behavioral and psychological 
attributes such as deliberate markers, meaningful errors, 
preparatory behaviors, verbal behaviors, correlated usage, and 
personality traits. 
C. Implement an Audit System 
King and Parulekar in their paper in 2004 [9] stated the need 
for an audit system that would enable an enterprise to determine 
a comprehensive set of incompatible functions. This was in 
response to the prominent corporate scandals surrounding the 
2002 period. In their paper in 2004, King and Parulekar 
discussed an audit system, designed for segregation-of-duties 
reporting. This audit system could also verify the validity of 
segregation of incompatible functions, generate alerts when 
incompatible functions are assigned to the same individual, and 
further prevent access to incompatible functions.  
D. Synergies between Technical And Procedural Processes, 
and Use of Neural And Statistical Methods 
David  [8] proposed a method based on Enterprise Planning 
Systems that would use a combination of procedural and 
technical processes to detect fraud. The paper [10] offered a 
comparison between utilizing neural networks and Bayesian 
methods in computer-related fraud detection.  
E. Addressing SoD in ERP Systems 
Proctor, Heiser, and MacDonald[11] discussed the 
following three techniques to address SoD conflicts in ERP 
systems: identifying and reducing conflicts at the application-
level using functional permissions; integration with existing 
user provisioning and role management processes; 
automatically monitoring for transactions that indicate 
inappropriate behaviour. 
F. Use behavioral Attributes to Tag Individuals 
Although most current approaches in detecting insider 
threats are technical in nature, [12] argued that individuals with 
certain attributes are more likely to commit fraud than people 
who do not possess these attributes, and suggested to 
supplement technology-related controls with behavioral 
attributes and utilize personal background information by 
assigning ‘tags’ to internal employees which could include 
information about their financial, credit and bankruptcy history. 
The authors of [13] augmented this idea by proposing the 
addition of psychological attributes of people. In addition, it 
was suggested in[14] that behavioral and sociological aspects 
be considered to strengthen the defenses against insider attacks. 
G. Audit Reporting 
Many companies rely on audit reporting, where 
management is trained to use a software package that generates 
reports of conflicting duties [15]. The software packages 
available today, although preventive in nature, also have 
detection capability in the form of reporting. Reporting is 
manually invoked, and is usually performed at given time 
intervals, thus, this model does not provide for real-time 
detection of SoD conflicts. 
III. ABS BANKING COPORATION – A CASE STUDY ON SOD 
CONFLICTS 
A survey conducted by Gramling, Hermanson, Hermanson, 
and Yeregarding the nature of SoD weaknesses highlighted that 
the most common areas in accounting affected by the lack of 
SoD include cash disbursements, cash accounts, payables and 
receivables, purchase, and period-end closing [16].  
The following case study illustrates how a SoD conflict was 
used to commit fraud during the purchasing process. 
A. Company Background 
ABS Banking Corporation(ABS) is a small-sized financial 
institution operating in the South East Asia region consisting of 
over500 employees.To assist operational management in 
purchasing any resource required to support its function, ABS 
uses a centralized purchasing IT system that is located in its 
headquarters in Singapore. 
B. ABS’ Purchasing Process 
The purchasingprocess at ABS is composed of 8 key 
phasesand has defined rules (see Table 1) that must be followed 
when provisioning users to create a purchase order. This rule 
matrix is designed to minimize the risk of employee errors or 
deliberate and unauthorized transactions when processing 
purchase orders. The tasks which are marked ‘X’ mean they are 
conflicting duties. Therefore, users must not be assigned both of 
the corresponding tasks. This approach is aligned with [9] in 
which a list of incompatible functions is maintained. 
The standard process for buying goods or services by 
employees on behalf of ABS Banking Corporation is illustrated 
in Figure 1. 
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standard ABS matrix used in assigning roles in order to avoid 
SoD and Erica was at fault in not implementing it in this case. 
To summarize, despite the threat being around for a number 
of years, proactively addressing incidents brought by a breach 
of SoD is still a significant challenge. Even with theavailability 
of commercial software packages,many organizations still 
struggle to effectively address SoD conflicts. 
TABLE 1. EXAMPLE SOD ROLE-MATRIX 
Proces
s 
Crea
te 
mast
er 
data 
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PO 
Appro
ve PO 
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and 
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Proce
ss 
invoic
e 
Proces
s 
payme
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payme
nt file 
Create 
master 
data 
 X X X X X X 
Create 
PO   X  X X  
Appro
ve PO  X   X X  
Receiv
e 
Goods 
and 
Service
s  
       
Proces
s 
invoice 
     X  
Proces
s 
payme
nt 
 X X  X   
Gener
ate 
payme
nt file 
 X X     
 
V. FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, we discussed some of the current strategies 
available to prevent and detect SoD conflicts, and have 
illustrated the challenges through a case study.  
Fundamental to preventing and detecting insider attacks can 
be determining the motivation behind them. Hunker and Probst 
noted that this seems to vary among countries or geographic 
location [2]. In future work, we will continue to understand 
further the motivation behind fraud based on SoD conflicts, and 
explore ways of using behavioral or psychological attributes to 
identify potential insider threats.  
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